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In June 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided three 
closely watched deportation cases by 5–4 votes: Zadvydas v. Davis;1 
Calcano-Martinez v. INS.;2 and INS. v. St. Cyr.3 The prospective deportees avoided 
deportation in all three cases; the “liberal” position, if you will, prevailed.4 The 
Court at the time consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and, in order of senior-
ity, Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer. Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer were in the majority in all three of 
these cases; Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas were in dissent. Kennedy provided the 
deciding vote in Calcano-Martinez and St. Cyr; O’Connor in Zadvydas.
The voting coalitions in these three cases were quite — but not perfectly — 
frozen: Four of the five justices in the majority coalitions in all three cases were 
the same; three of the four justices in the dissenting coalitions were the same. But 
for O’Connor and Kennedy switching sides in Zadvydas, the coalitions would have 
been identical in all three cases.
This comports to prevailing descriptions of the Court’s coalitions at the time: 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer were the “liberals”; Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Thomas were the “conservatives”; O’Connor and Kennedy were the “swing votes.”5
But decided the same month was the well-known Kyllo v. United States,6 
in which the Court held by a 5–4 vote that a warrant was required before the 
government could use a thermal-imaging device to scan a home for heat consis-
tent with high-intensity lamps for marijuana growth. As such, the liberal position 
also prevailed but the coalitions were quite different. The majority coalition 
consisted of Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer; the dissenting coalition 
of Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, and Kennedy. Two of the conservatives voted 
liberal, for the criminal defendant; one of the liberals and both of the swing votes 
voted conservative.
A year earlier, when the Court had reversed a conviction in another well-known 
case, Apprendi v. New Jersey,7 the coalitions also did not accord to the popular 
description: Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg were in the majority 
coalition; Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer dissented. Two of the conser-
vatives voted liberal, for the defendant; one of the liberals voted conservative. 
Indeed, the core of the majority coalition in Kyllo and Apprendi were Scalia, Souter, 
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Thomas, and Ginsburg; Stevens and Breyer 
were the swing votes.
Also during June 2001, the Indiana 
Supreme Court, the state’s five-justice court 
of last resort, decided two criminal law cases 
by a divided 3–2 vote. In one case, Segura v. 
State,8 the defendant’s argument prevailed; 
in the other, Sanchez v. State,9 the state’s. But 
though the liberal position prevailed in the 
first case and the conservative in the second, 
the change in outcome was not a function 
of a swing vote. Rather, the coalitions in the 
two cases were completely different. The 
court at the time consisted of Chief Justice 
Randall T. Shepard and, in order of seniority, 
Justices Brent E. Dickson, Frank Sullivan, 
Jr. (an author of this article), Theodore R. 
Boehm, and Robert D. Rucker. The major-
ity coalition in Segura (where the liberal 
position prevailed) consisted of Dickson, 
Boehm, and Rucker; the minority of 
Shepard and Sullivan. In Sanchez (where the 
conservative position prevailed), the major-
ity coalition consisted of Shepard, Dickson, 
and Boehm; the minority of Sullivan and 
Rucker. To the extent anything can be general-
ized from these two cases, it is that three of the 
five justices — Dickson, Boehm, and Sullivan 
— were swing votes: Each voted with the 
liberal position in one of these cases and the 
conservative in the other.
The seven cases just discussed illustrate 
that the coalitions comprising the majority 
and minority positions can and do vary in 
tightly split decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court and state courts of last resort 
(referred to in this article as state supreme 
courts). But how fluid or stable are those 
coalitions? Were the voting coalitions in 
closely divided cases on the 2000–01 United 
States Supreme Court stable (as Zadvydas, 
Calcano-Martinez, and St. Cyr suggest) and 
the coalitions in Apprendi and Kyllo simply 
anomalies? Were the voting coalitions in 
closely divided cases on the 2001 Indiana 
Supreme Court as fluid as Segura and Sanchez 
suggest or were they in fact much less fluid? 
More broadly, were voting coalitions on 
the U.S. Supreme Court more fluid in the 
’50s than in the ’90s? How does the U.S. 
Supreme Court compare to state supreme 
courts from this perspective?
We develop in this article an index that 
measures the concept of fluidity in coali-
tions between judges in supreme courts 
in American jurisdictions.10 If, in one 
court, the same coalition of judges always 
votes together, in either the majority or the 
dissent, we would observe low fluidity due 
to stable coalitions. A different court, in 
which judges align in majority and dissent 
in different coalitions in each opinion, 
would have greater fluidity; this court 
would have less stable coalitions. The index 
captures where each court lies in the spec-
trum from no fluidity whatsoever — frozen, 
totally stable coalitions, i.e., the same judges 
vote in exactly the same coalitions in every 
case — to absolutely fluid coalitions, where 
each judge votes proportionately with every 
other one. The index ranges from zero (0 
percent fluidity) to one (100 percent fluid-
ity). For this index to be useful, the value 
that it produces should allow the compar-
ison of courts of different sizes. Our index 
springs from a quadratic process, and we 
show that a linear index is inadequate.
The primary contribution of this article 
is the development of this index of fluidity of 
judicial coalitions.11 The index measures how 
a court’s coalitions form in what we refer 
to as “tightly split” opinions, such as 5–4 
opinions in a nine-member court, or 4–3 
opinions in a seven-member court.12 We 
know of no prior metric that can measure 
coalition formation in court decisions. 
A secondary, implicit, but perhaps 
nontrivial contribution is that, when 
comparing the relative degree of coali-
tion voting by courts, the relevant period 
that we use is the time during which the 
composition of the court is unchanged. 
This coincides with the time period during 
which a particular justice is the court’s 
most-junior justice as the tenure of that 
justice determines, by definition, the 
period of time during which the member-
ship of the court remains unchanged. 
We observe that this is at odds with the 
popular and conventional focus on, and 
naming of, eras of courts by the name of 
the chief justice. During a single chief 
justice’s tenure, old associate justices leave 
the court and new ones take their seats, 
frustrating the idea that the court is the 
same. Our approach, by contrast, focuses 
on the most recently appointed justice, the 
“junior justice,” as the one who determines 
the composition of the court. While that 
justice is the junior justice, the composi-
tion of the court truly does not change.13 
When we refer to the “Breyer court,” for 
example, we refer to the period when 
Justice Breyer was the junior justice, from 
his appointment in August of 1994 to the 
appointment of Chief Justice Roberts in 
September of 2005. The junior justice, 
accordingly, may well be the chief justice, 
as was the case from the appointment of 
Chief Justice Roberts until that of Justice 
Alito in January of 2006.
The literature on judicial behavior, 
including coalition formation, is enor-
mous.14 The study of coalitions on the 
United States Supreme Court is not new, 
and various perspectives or explanations 
have been used in analyzing it.15 However, 
the dominant approach, especially recently, 
focuses on a division from political left to 
right.16 Several scholars point out this is 
insufficient.17 Joshua Fishman and Tonja 
Jacobi have even a concrete proposed second 
dimension, from pragmatism to legalism,18 
and in older data Glendon Schubert also 
finds two main dimensions (economic 
and civic liberalism) and some minor 
scales (that might be abbreviated as fiscal, 
activist, statist, and supervisory [of lower 
courts] attitudes).19 We counter that an 
[T]he dominant approach, 
especially recently, focuses 
on a division from political 
left to right. Several scholars 
point out this is insufficient.
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advantage of the proposed index is that 
the index remains agnostic with respect to 
direction or even the number of dimensions 
in the decision space.20
Our paper joins the above descrip-
tive literature because we do not propose 
an optimal level of coalition formation, 
which further research may change. The 
literature on judicial incentives, related to 
the appointment process, is also vast, and 
includes prior work by some of us.21
INTRODUCING THE INDEX AND DATA
The target of our analysis is the forma-
tion of coalitions in courts of constant 
composition that have a number of judges 
that is small and odd. The United States 
Supreme Court or that of Canada, with 
nine judges, are leading examples; as are 
others with seven, such as the Supreme 
Court of Australia and the courts of last 
resort of Arizona, California, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and New York. The index 
also applies to jurisdictions with five- 
member supreme courts, like Indiana.
Given the variety of sizes of courts, and 
the reality of split opinions, the question 
arises how to compare the fluidity of coali-
tions in voting on tightly split opinions in 
different courts. We propose such a measure, 
apply it to the United States Supreme Court 
from 1946 to 2014, the period covered by 
supremecourtdatabase.org, and to a period 
of the Indiana Supreme Court from 1999 to 
2010, and discuss the results.
The mathematical formulas producing 
the index appear in this article’s appendix, 
which is available at law.duke.edu/judica-
ture/volume100-number3. The proposed 
index of fluidity of judicial coalitions begins 
by calculating how often each justice sides 
with each other justice in tightly split 
opinions. In other words, the springboard 
is a set of pairwise percentages of agree-
ment. We derive the agreement percentage 
that would exist in a perfectly fluid court, 
one where each justice agrees the same 
with every other justice because the court 
issues the same number of tightly split 
opinions from every possible coalition. 
This is the average rate of agreement a. 
The next steps of calculating the index are 
to calculate the squared differences of each 
actual pairwise rate of agreement from the 
average rate of agreement, to take the aver-
age of the squared differences, and compute 
the square root s of the average squared 
difference. We also derive the maximum 
square root r of the averaged squared 
differences, what would correspond to utter 
lack of fluidity. The index is one minus 
the ratio of the square root of the squared 
differences to the maximum square root 
of averaged squared differences, 1 – s / r. 
If a court’s tightly split opinions come 
from a single coalition, then this ratio will 
be one and the value of the index will be 
zero, i.e., the voting coalitions in every 
tightly split opinion are exactly the same. 
The opposite extreme is a table of justice 
agreement where each cell has the average 
value of justice agreement because each 
justice has agreed with every other justice 
equally; in this case, the s/r ratio will be 
zero and the index will be one, i.e., justices 
ally with each other exactly proportion-
ately. All other tables of justice agreement, 
where each justice agrees with each other 
justice at other rates, produce index values 
between zero and one. The value of the 
index approaches one as justices agree with 
each other more proportionately.
The index of fluidity of judicial coali-
tions is standardized to the size of courts 
and allows not only comparisons between 
courts of the same size, but also to courts of 
different sizes. A court of any size, as long 
as it has an odd number of judges, will 
produce a series of tightly split opinions 
under constant composition of the court, 
or under the same junior justice. Those 
tightly split opinions, regardless of the 
court’s size, can produce index values 
ranging from 0 to 1. In every case, if the 
index produces the value of zero, then 
the court issued all tightly split opinions 
using a single coalition. At the opposite 
extreme, again regardless of the court’s 
size, if the index takes a value of 1, then 
the court issued its tightly split opin-
ions proportionately from every possible 
coalition.22 In practice, both extremes seem 
farfetched. A court where a single majority 
coalition issues all tightly split opinions 
would likely seem dysfunctional from 
various perspectives. Similarly, the opposite 
extreme of no tendency for some judges 
to vote together (that would be necessary 
for index values of very high fluidity) 
contradicts notions of the existence of any 
commonality of personal judicial and legal 
philosophies or even notions of justice. 
The index of fluidity of judicial coali-
tions is sensitive to the composition of 
coalitions.23 For example, consider two 
courts that produce their tightly split 
opinions mostly from two coalitions. Those 
coalitions can be very similar. The second 
majority coalition may be the minority of 
the first coalition with the addition of a 
single swing vote. Yet, the two coalitions 
can have greater differences, if several 
justices change sides. This latter case would 
lead to a greater value of the index of fluid-
ity of judicial coalitions. Take the example 
of a nine-member court. Two coalitions of 
equal productivity with a single swing vote 
produce an index value of .12, whereas two 
coalitions with four swing votes, where the 
majority loses two votes to the minority 
and gains two votes from the minority, 
produce an index of fluidity of .34.24
A limitation of the index of fluidity of 
judicial coalitions is that it springs from 
only the tightly split opinions. Other 
opinions, where the majority had superflu-
ous votes, do not influence the value of the 
index but may hide important phenomena. 
The frequency of tightly split opinions may 
also be informative in its own merit, yet the 
index does not capture it. However, figure 
1 (page 41) uses the thickness of the lines 
marking the value of the index to express 
the frequency of tightly split opinions.25
We stress that the index is standard-
ized with respect to court size but need 
to explain the importance of the number 
of possible coalitions, which increases 
exponentially with the size of the court. 
The index runs from zero to one as a 
court’s coalitions go from a single domi-
nant coalition to the opposite extreme of 
proportional issuance of opinions from all 
possible coalitions. A smaller court has a 
much smaller number of possible coali-
tions.26 For example, a five-member court 
has ten possible coalitions and will produce 
a high index of coalition fluidity if it forms 
seven or eight coalitions to issue opinions 
proportionately. But a nine-member court 
has 126 possible coalitions and a vast 
number of possible ways that its members 
can ally with others.27 In a nine-member 
court, the formation of seven or eight 
coalitions can either correspond to fairly 
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little change between coalitions or to large 
changes, with correspondingly different 
values of the index of fluidity of coalitions. 
Given the much greater range of coalitions 
available to members of a nine-member 
court, and especially if the seven or eight 
coalitions we observe do not differ much, 
the values of the fluidity index that they 
would produce could be much smaller than 
those of the five-member court. 
This feature of the index is not in 
harmony with median voter models 
of judicial voting that use few dimen-
sions. Median voter models would tend 
to produce similar counts of coalitions 
regardless of size of the court. For exam-
ple, consider a one-dimensional model of 
judicial decisions, perhaps with the single 
dimension running from conservatism to 
liberalism governing 
the resolution of all 
disputes. In this model, 
the median justice sepa-
rates the liberal block 
from the conservative 
block. The only disputes 
that give rise to tightly 
split opinions are those 
arising adjacent to the 
median justice.28 If this 
model drove all judicial 
decisions, then, regard-
less of court size, the 
tightly split opinions 
would tend to come 
from only two groups, 
either from the conser-
vative justices plus the 
median justice, or from 
the liberal justices plus 
the median justice. In 
other words, with minor 
caveats, a median voter 
model with few dimen-
sions indicates both 
a limited number of 
coalitions and similarity 
between the coalitions, 
because each court 
would have one swing 
vote per dimension.
The tension between 
the index and median 
voter models of judging 
is that, whereas the 
index treats all variation between coali-
tions the same way, median voter models 
of judging determine the absolute number 
of coalitions in tightly split decisions. For 
median voter models, the size of the court 
is irrelevant for the expected number of 
coalitions. By contrast, for the index, the 
potential existence of more coalitions in 
a larger court means that increasing the 
size of the court without increasing the 
variability of coalitions produces a smaller 
value of the index. If, for example, adjudi-
cation was driven by a single dimension, 
then all courts would have two coalitions 
in tightly split opinions. Or, if adjudica-
tion was driven by two dimensions, then 
all courts would have four coalitions in 
tightly split opinions. Under the assump-
tions of such a median voter model, larger 
courts would still only have two or four 
coalitions and tend to produce smaller 
values of their fluidity index. This would 
be most pronounced if judging followed 
a one-dimensional median voter model. A 
fuller discussion of the relation of the index 
to median voter judging is at the end of 
the appendix.
The existence of the Supreme Court 
Database (supremecourtdatabase.org) 
allows us to apply this index to measure 
the fluidity of coalitions in periods when 
the United States Supreme Court had 
stable membership and issued a sufficient 
number of 5–4 opinions. A limiting factor 
is that the database presently only reaches 
back to 1946, not containing the voting 
details for earlier decisions. However, for 
the period after 1946, the database offers 
the composition of every 
majority and dissent. 
We have constructed 
a similar database for the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
covering the lengthy 
period from Nov. 19, 
1999, to Sept. 30, 2010, 
during which there 
was no change in the 
membership of that court.
The logic of the 
index means that we 
count opinions rather 
than disputes. A single 
opinion may give closure 
to several disputes with 
different party names.29 
Thus, when several 
disputes are listed in 
the database but they all 
receive disposition by a 
single opinion, we count 
that as a single opinion. 
To repeat, we only 
count 5–4 opinions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court 
and 3–2 opinions of the 
Indiana Supreme Court. 
We only count 5–4 
(3–2) opinions even if 
recusals or vacancies may 
produce a tightly split 
opinion of a smaller size, 
such as a 4–3 opinion 
by the experience of two 
TABLE 1.   JUSTICE AGREEMENT FOR THE 5–4 OPINIONS OF THE COURT  
  WITH POWELL AND REHNQUIST AS THE JUNIOR JUSTICES
  D. BR. ST. WH. MAR. BUR. BL. P. REHN.
DOUGLAS – .84 .62 .39 .87 .08 .19 .21 .09
BRENNAN  – .56 .46 .88 .11 .24 .15 .08
STEWART   – .20 .68 .33 .31 .39 .36
WHITE    – .41 .58 .61 .47 .57
MARSHALL     – .05 .17 .19 .06
BURGER      – .83 .80 .95
BLACKMUN       – .63 .79
POWELL        – .83
REHNQUIST         –
TABLE 2: JUSTICE AGREEMENT FOR THE 5–4 OPINIONS OF THE BREYER COURT
  R. ST. O’C SC. KEN. SOU. TH. GIN. BR.
REHNQUIST – .06 .73 .87 .80 .08 .86 .09 .13
STEVENS  – .27 .10 .22 .89 .15 .88 .85
O’CONNOR   – .64 .61 .26 .68 .24 .31
SCALIA    – .75 .14 .90 .14 .09
KENNEDY     – .20 .75 .19 .23
SOUTER      – .14 .89 .85
THOMAS       – .11 .07
GINSBURG        – .86
BREYER         –
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vacancies on the United States Supreme 
Court. The production of the index 
requires a significant number of opinions 
and the handful of such smaller tight splits 
does not allow the index to be meaning-
fully applied to them.
THREE EXAMPLES
Before offering the history of the fluid-
ity values for the United States Supreme 
Court, we walk over three calculations of 
the index.
The Powell-Rehnquist Court
Consider the opinions issued while 
Justices Powell and Rehnquist were the 
junior justices.30 The court at the time 
consisted of Chief Justice Burger and, 
in order of seniority, Justices Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, 
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. The 
first 5–4 opinion was issued on Feb. 22, 
1972,31 and the last 5–4 opinion before the 
appointment of the next justice, Justice 
Stevens, was issued on June 30, 1976.32 
The number of 5–4 opinions in this 
period is 109. As this is a nine-mem-
ber court, we know that the number of 
possible five-member coalitions is 126.33 
Rather than a broad number of coalitions 
each issuing one or a very small number 
of opinions, we observe lack of fluidity. 
Twenty-six coalitions issue opinions, i.e., 
only 21 percent of the possible number of 
coalitions actually form. Some coalitions 
issue only one or two opinions (11 coali-
tions issue one opinion and eight coalitions 
issue two opinions) but many opinions 
come from a small number of coalitions. 
The most prolific coalition produces 49 
opinions, 34 percent of all the tightly split 
opinions. The Court’s alignment for these 
cases consists of Burger, White, Blackmun, 
Powell, and Rehnquist in the majority and 
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall 
in dissent.
The second most prolific coalition, that 
produces 18 opinions, 16.5 percent, has 
Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Rehnquist in the majority, and Douglas, 
Brennan, White, and Marshall in dissent. 
Essentially, the difference from the most 
prolific coalition is that Stewart and White 
exchange positions, a difference of two 
swing votes. Thus, this is not a case where 
a constant 4–4 split exists and one swing 
vote changes the minority into a majority.
The third most prolific coalition, 
that produces ten opinions, 9 percent, 
has Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, 
White, and Marshall in the majority, and 
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist 
in the dissent. This coalition is similar to 
the second most prolific one, in that the 
four justices there in the dissent are in the 
majority here with Stewart joining them as 
the swing vote. 
The fourth most prolific coalition, 
producing only five opinions or 4.6 percent, 
has Burger, Blackmun, Brennan, White, 
and Rehnquist in the majority and Douglas, 
Marshall, Powell, and Stewart in dissent. 
This is a new coalition; the one similarity 
with the more prolific ones is that Douglas 
and Marshall are on the same side. 
To calculate the index of fluidity, as 
the appendix explains, we produce the 
table of justice agreement, table 1. The 
justices appear in the order that they were 
appointed. Squaring the differences of 
each cell from the average cell value of a 
= .4444, averaging them and taking the 
square root produces a value of s = .2804. 
Compared to the root of the average of 
squared differences of the most extreme 
lack of fluidity that a nine-member court 
can produce, r = .4969, and subtracting 
from one gives the value of the index of 
fluidity f = .44.34
Having seen that the period with 
Powell and Rehnquist as the junior justices 
produces an index of fluidity of judicial 
coalitions of .44, we turn to a different 
period of the court, when Justice Breyer 
was the junior justice.
The Breyer Court
Justice Breyer holds the record for the 
longest service as the junior justice and 
thus produces the longest term of constant 
composition in the Supreme Court. The 
court consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and, in order of seniority, Justices Stevens, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer. The court produced 
191 tightly split opinions from Nov. 14, 
199435 to June 27, 2005,36 the last tightly 
split opinion before the next appoint-
ment, that of Chief Justice Roberts. This 
produces an ample number of opinions that 
could have, in theory, occupied the entire 
spectrum of the 126 possible coalitions. 
However, the court in this period aligns in 
only 37 coalitions, i.e., only 29 percent of 
the maximum. Moreover, only three produce 
a number of opinions greater than five. 
The most prolific coalition produces 88 
opinions, or over 46 percent of the total. The 
majority has Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, 
Rather than a broad number 
of  coalitions each issuing 
one or a very small number 
of  opinions, we observe lack 
of  fluidity [in the Powell-
Rehnquist court]. Twenty-six 
coalitions issue opinions, 
i.e., only 21 percent of  the 
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Two other coalitions form in 25 (14 
percent) cases each. The first consists of 
Shepard, Dickson, and Sullivan in the 
majority with Boehm and Rucker in dissent. 
The second consists of Shepard, Dickson, 
and Boehm in the majority with Sullivan 
and Rucker in dissent.
A fifth coalition consisting of Dickson, 
Boehm, and Rucker in the majority with 
Shepard and Sullivan in dissent forms in 18 
cases or 10 percent of the total. 
This presentation of the judicial coali-
tions for the Rucker court — in which 90 
percent of the possible coalitions form and 
five coalitions account for 78 percent of the 
split decisions — suggests a much greater 
fluidity than the Breyer court, in which 
only 29 percent of the possible coalitions 
actually form and three coalitions account 
for 74 percent (two coalitions for 62 percent) 
of the tightly split decisions. The index 
confirms this.
Table 3 is the Rucker court’s table 
of justice agreement. The Rucker court 
produces a square root of differences from 
average agreement of s = .1198. Compared 
to the most extreme lack of fluidity, r = 
.4899, the Rucker court gives a fluidity 
index, f = 1 – s/r, of f = .78. This is a value 
greater than the fluidity observed in any 
period of the United States Supreme Court.
SUPREME COURT COALITION 
FLUIDITY 1946-2014
We calculate the fluidity of 5–4 coalitions 
of the United States Supreme Court from 
1946 to 2014, the period covered by the 
Supreme Court Database, and 3–2 coalitions 
of the Indiana Supreme Court from 1999 to 
2010. Table 4 shows the results and figure 1 
illustrates them.
The first column of table 4 holds the 
name of the junior justice. The second 
column holds the date of the first tightly 
split opinion, in the format of month/
day/year. The third column holds the date 
of the last opinion. The fourth column 
presents the fluidity index value. The next 
column, titled N, gives the number of 
tightly split opinions in the period. The 
final column gives the number of tightly 
split opinions per month.41 We do not 
present periods with fewer than 30 opin-
ions.42 The last opinion of the Kagan court 
is the last one included by the database, 
rather than the actually last as of the time 
of this writing.
Figure 1 illustrates the data reported 
in table 4. The horizontal axis holds dates 
from early 1946 to mid-2014, the end of 
the database. Each horizontal line corre-
sponds to one composition of the court. 
Each line begins at the date of the first 
tightly split opinion issued with that 
composition and ends at the date of its 
last tightly split opinion. The vertical axis 
measures the fluidity index. Accordingly, 
lines that appear higher correspond to peri-
ods of greater fluidity of coalitions, to peri-
ods when justices aligned in more different 
ways when issuing tightly split opinions. 
Lower lines correspond to periods when 
justices’ coalitions were less fluid, to the 
utilization of fewer coalitions when issuing 
tightly split opinions. The thickness of the 
lines corresponds to the number of tightly 
split opinions issued by that composition 
of the court per month. The letters above 
each line signal the surname of the junior 
justice of that period. The figure also 
includes the Rucker court for comparison 
as a dashing line. The discontinuities are 
due to us not reporting the index for peri-
ods with fewer than 30 opinions.43 
The height combined with the thick-
ness of the lines reveals something about 
periods with comparable duration. 
Compare the five-year period of the Stevens 
court to that of O’Connor’s court. The 
Stevens court produces greater fluidity and 
fewer tightly split opinions (per month but 
also overall) than the O’Connor court. 
DISCUSSION
These data reveal two differences. First, 
the United States Supreme Court seems 
to switch to lower fluidity values with the 
appointment of Justice Scalia. While pres-
ently this switch is not statistically signif-
icant, the average liquidity before Scalia 
is above .48 whereas the average liquidity 
from Scalia on is below .37. As we intend 
to demonstrate in subsequent work, it is 
the change that comes closest to being 
statistically significant. Thus, if a change 
occurred, it likely manifested with Justice 
Scalia, his appointment, or surrounding 
changes in the political environment.
Second, the United States Supreme 
Court exhibits fluidity far smaller than that 
exhibited by the Indiana Supreme Court. 
Additional research may point to more 
differences but we hypothesize that the 
differences in judicial selection methods, 
political expectations, and public scrutiny 
help explain the dramatic variation between 
the index for the United States and the 
Indiana Supreme Court.
Consider first the method of selection 
of justices of the United States Supreme 
Court: nominated by the President but 
subject to Senate confirmation. Since at 
least the Nixon-Humphrey campaign 
of 1968, Republican and Democratic 
candidates for President have promised 
 FIGURE 1:  U.S. SUPREME COURT FLUIDITY, 1946-2014 AND  
                RUCKER COURT FLUIDITY (DASHING)
Each line represents the number of tightly split opinions from a particular coalition, denoted by the name  of the 
court’s junior justice. The span of the line indicates the period of time over which the tightly split opinions were 
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the appointment of Supreme Court justices 
whose views accord with theirs.44 While 
Presidents have not always been success-
ful in this regard — either because of the 
failure to secure Senate confirmation or 
because of post-appointment surprises from 
the justices themselves — history shows 
general success in this regard.45 Presidents 
nominate justices whom they believe will 
tend to cast conservative/Republican or 
liberal/Democratic votes; for the most part, 
those justices do, and so the coalitions 
coalesce around the conservative and liberal 
positions and are not very fluid. As an excep-
tion that demonstrates the point, consider 
the widespread expressions of astonishment 
that followed Chief Justice Roberts’s vote to 
sustain the constitutionality of Obamacare.46
We offer this description as contrast 
to the way in which Indiana Supreme 
Court justices are appointed, not as a 
comprehensive explanation for the voting 
behavior of United States Supreme Court 
justices. Justices of the Indiana Supreme 
Court are appointed by the state’s governor 
but the governor’s hand is constrained by 
having to pick from a list of three nomi-
nees presented by the Indiana Judicial 
Nominating Commission, a constitutional 
body consisting of three lawyers elected 
by the lawyers of the state, three nonlaw-
yers appointed by the governor, and the 
incumbent chief justice, who serves as the 
commission’s chair.47 Perhaps because of 
this selection process, perhaps also for other 
reasons, Indiana has no tradition of gover-
nors campaigning for office on promises to 
appoint justices of a particular kind. 
Indiana has had this selection process 
since the 1970s; 11 justices have been 
appointed under it. The governor does not 
have the freedom to select an appointee 
whose views accord with his. And our obser-
vation is that because of this, governors have 
focused on factors other than likely voting 
behavior in making their decisions. While 
we acknowledge that no governor has ever 
appointed a justice not of his own politi-
cal party, we also observe that the Indiana 
Constitution mandates that the appoint-
ment be made “without regard to political 
affiliation.”48 The intermediation of the 
Nominating Commission process appears 
to have severed justices’ pre-appointment 
partisanship from any expectation that the 
justices’ voting behavior would be in accord 
with the appointing governors’ expectations.
As a consequence of the difference in 
selection process, we believe that a justice 
of the Indiana Supreme Court is much 
less likely than a justice of the United 
States Supreme Court to bring to the court 
predictable, party-line voting behavior. 
Because of this, Indiana justices are much 
less likely to find themselves regularly 
aligned with any other particular members 
of the court. This produces much more 
fluid coalitions in closely divided cases — 
and a much higher index of fluidity.
We recognize that the foregoing 
hypotheses for the differences between the 
index as calculated for the United States 
Supreme Court and Indiana Supreme 
Court suffer from a variety of limitations, 
including the fact that in looking only 
at the Powell, Breyer, and Rucker courts, 
something exceptional could influence one 
or more of those courts that would make 
its index anomalous. We do not purport 
to explain the differences in the index but 
merely begin discussion and invite further 
research on other courts.
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